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Much has been written about whether the hospital chief executive
officer/commanding officer should be a physician or an administrator.
Indeed, as health care systems become more complex and diverse, physicians
find themselves choosing between their status in the organizational hier-
archy and their increasingly technical and specialized medical fields.
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I. BAa<GROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Hospitals are among the most complicated organizations
in the world today. They ,are characterized by an extremely
fine division of labor and wide variety of skills. A hospital
is not only a place for the ill to seek care, it is also an
arena where teaching and research often take place. It can
be correctly identified as a hotel, a treatment center, a
laboratory, and a school, among other things. It is most
certainly a complex professional organization.
The personnel working in a hospital include physicians,
nurses, managers, technicians, housekeepers, social workers,
scientists that are skilled in fields allied to medicine,
and clerks, to mention a few. This myriad of personnel types
connected with the changing functions of hospitals, from a
place where one went to die, to a place that is an entire
social system in itself, demands that whomever is the chief
executive officer (CEO) —or commanding officer (CO) in the
case of the military—he/she must possess the necessary skills
and education to be able to integrate the wide variety of
personnel skills into an effective force, and do it
effectively.
This paper presents a model by which one can determine
the type of CEO a facility should have, based upon the orien-
tations and management requirements of that facility. That

all facilities must either have a physician or an administrator
as the CEO is not true.
The selection of the health care facility CEO/CO should
also rightly depend upon the system the facility must function
within. The objectives and goals of the various systems can
be better suited to an individual with a background conducive
to the system's goal achievement.
Perrow [Donabedian on Perrow, 1973] showed hospitals as
progressing through various stages until they arrived at a
stage where the survival of the organization outweighs all
else. But, prior to reaching the final stage, the hospital
is dominated by trustees and/or physicians whose primary con-
cern is the patient, the provider, or a combination of both.
Early hospitals were most likely to be run by nurses, as
they were nearly always present. The physician merely used
the hospital as a practicing base. Indeed, MacEachern [1957]
identified Florence Nightingale as the first hospital
administrator
.
Later, as the population grew, physicians began to spend
more and more of their time at the hospital, because it was
easier for the multitude of patients to meet collectively
than for the provider to see each patient at a separate
location. This system survives today.
The superior education and social standing of the physi-
cian eventually brought him to the forefront of the organiza-
tion of the hospital. He became, at once, the provider and
10

the chief executive officer, overseeing the entire operation
of the facility. This was before there were any educational
program of any consequence in the field of hospital
administration.
As technology, organizational complexity, and specializa-
tion reached higher levels, the provider found himself having
to choose between practicing medicine, or managing a hospital.
The need for a specialist in hospital administration had been created,
Subsequently, the field of hospital administration has
become a profession in itself, although many physicians do
not consider administrators to be their peers [Bellin, 1973;
Sheinbach, 1974] . Accordingly, many health care systems have
turned over the reins of power to professional managers. On
the other hand, many have held on to the system where the
physician not only treats the patient, but also rules the
hospital. The Navy health care system fits the latter category.
In the face of ever increasing physician shortages that
are presently plagueing the Navy, one must ask whether the
utilization of physicians is a prudent use of an already
scarce resource; to wit, are the budget and economic costs
foregone through this practice the best use of the Navy's
resources? This paper purports to provide a method by which
that determination can be made. Regardless of the specific
answer one derives from the model this paper presents, there
is no doubt that the hospital CO/CEO will have to be increas-
ingly well-educated and sophisticated to function effectively
11

in the health care environment; above all, leadership and





In contemplating which methods were to be used in this
study to determine whether a physician or an administrator
should be the commanding officer/chief executive officer
(CO/CEO) of a health care facility, it was initially decided
that the most effective method would be one of comparison.
That is, if one is to determine whether the Navy is utilizing
its physicians efficiently, he or she must use as a criterion
other health care systems. The Navy's and indeed the entire
armed forces' medical systems, while being of considerable
size, are only a fraction of the entire national health care
system. Therefore, it is postulated that health care systems
other than military are the norm, and deviations of the mili-
tary health service system (MHSS) from this norm should be
identified and analyzed.
Data Collection
Institutions were initally selected for comparison on
the basis of close proximity to the Monterey Peninsula for
economic reasons and the type of institution with regard to
the teaching function, the profit motive, and whether the
facility was governmental ly based. The San Francisco Bay
area was selected for its proximity, Stanford University
Medical Center (SUMC) was selected for its teaching function,
13

Kaiser Foundation Hospital of San Francisco (KFHSF) was
selected for its proprietary nature, and the San Francisco
Veterans' Administration Hospital (VAHSF) and Public Health
Service Hospital (PHSHSF) were selected for being two dif-
ferent systems with federal government affiliation.
Each of the above mentioned organization's CEOs were
interviewed by the author, with the exception of SUMC, where
an assistant administrator was interviewed. In addition,
documentary information was obtained from all the organiza-
tions to allow determination of their individual organiza-
tional structures and functions.
Subsequently, requests for assistance and participation
were mailed to the American College of Health Care Administra-
tors (ACHA) , the American Medical Association (AMA) , the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) , the
U.S. Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) , Hospital
Corporation of America, Inc., Humana, Inc., Lifemark, Inc.,
and National Medical Enterprises, Inc. It was felt that
these institutions provided a reasonable cross section of
types of health care institutions found in the United States
which exercise a measure of control over health care delivery
systems
.
Of all the administrative positions that Navy physicians
occupy, that of a hospital or treatment facility commanding
officer (CO) is probably the most visible and one that has
the nearest direct counterpart in other systems. Therefore,
14

it was decided that the CO position would be examined in
contrast to its civilian counterpart, the chief executive
officer (CEO) of a civilian health care facility.
The Model
A model was devised within which the CO/CEO comparison
could be conducted. The model basically states that the
importance of administrative duties, responsibilities, and
accountabilities, as opposed to clinical duties, responsi-
bilities, and accountabilities, determines whether the CO/CEO
position will be occupied by an MD or an administrator. Also,
the model takes into consideration v/ho the facility is treat-
ing, where the facility's operating funds come from, and
whether the patient is the principal beneficiary of the
physician/patient relationship.
The model is based on a concept of stages of organizational
development that will permit the evaluation of the duties of
the CO/CEO with respect to his involvement in administrative
or clinicial functions and responsibilities. The model is
akin to Perrow's [1961] three essential states an organiza-
tion goes through in its effective lifetime and Donabedian's
[1973J classification of an organization's objectives.
In Perrow's model the initial stage is governed by trust-
ees who view the organization's principal need to be accept-
ance and financial support. Subsequently, the primary
emphasis shifts to the most skillful tasks that the
15

organization performs. In this stage, called medical domina-
tion, the experts who have the necessary skills become the
dominant force and the most influential in setting organiza-
tional objectives. When an organization finally becomes so
complex that it embraces many skills and interacts with other
organizations, it has a need for skillful management and co-
ordination. This need fosters the third stage of administrative
dominance which is based primarily on the complexity of basic
hospital activity. This is the final and most progressive
stage [Donabedian, 1973, on Perrow, p. 36].
Donabedian's main objectives of a medical care organiza-
tion are (1) client oriented, representing a humanitarian
tradition of service where primary attention is given to
client welfare and adoption of client wishes and desires,
(2) provider oriented objectives which are meant to serve
the interests of those who provide the care, among whom the
physician is paramount, and (3) organization oriented object-
ives which primarily serve the organization [Donabedian, 1973]
.
It is obvious that these two models share some of the
same characteristics. The model presented within this paper,
while somewhat similar, is not on a one-to-one basis with
the models of Perrow and Donabedian; rather, it is an inte-
grated model which was created for the specific purpose of
helping determine whether an MD or an administrator should
be the CO/CEO of a given health care facility.
16

The CO/CEO determination model says that medical treat-
ment facilities go through three stages, just as in Perrow's
model. But, where Perrow's model speaks of stages of domina-
tion and Donabedian ' s speaks of objectives, the CO/CEO model
simply reflects an organization's need for a particular type
of leader based upon its own organizational orientation. Also,
just as in Perrow's model, the CO/CEO model can show any given
hospital in either of the three categories; but, unlike Perrow's
model, the CO/CEO model does not state that a hospital will
always move from one category to another as organizational
complexity increases. Rather, the organization will move to
a different category only when its organizations change enough
to warrant the move. Further, the move does not necessarily
have to be in one direction.
The three organizational modes of the CO/CEO model are:
1. Primary medical care orientation
2. Health care provider orientation
3. Organizational orientation
The health care system that has primary medical care as
its main orientation is characterized by an emphasis on the
^ provision of health care. Health care is of primary impor-
tance while the wants and needs of the provider and the system
are secondary. Examples of this type of orientation are (1)
a one doctor facility in undeveloped areas or remote loca-
tions, such as an island in Puget Sound, (2) one of the many
one-doctor-owned hospitals in Japan, or (3) primitive medical
17

support of ground combat forces where litter bearers and aid-
men serve the medical officer who treats the sick and wounded.
The system oriented on the health care provider is highly
specialized and technical. It considers the physician as its
chief resource, and the system practically exists to support
him or her. This is a world where research, training, quality
of care, professional judgment, and physician compensation
are buttressed by the physician's refusal to turn over the
reins of management to qualified administrators.
The system that is organizationally oriented is also highly
specialized and technical. It is a system that emerges when
its survival requires the organizational adoption and utili-
zation of modern management techniques because of the increas-
ing importance and complexity of its personnel, financial,
supply, support, industrial relations, and facility upkeep
functions. The patient care function remains with the physi-
cians. "Organizational efficiency that is consistent with
good health care," is the key phrase in the organizationally
oriented system.
The specific characteristics of each of the three modes
of the CO/CEO determination model are:




d. responsiveness to client
e. client's freedom of choice
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These characteristics resemble Donabedian's [p. 40-41] objec-
tives of medical care organization to a large degree, albeit
not entirely.
In the context of the care oriented mode, the client
access characteristic is defined as the degree to which the
patient or client is economically able to afford care at a
specific institution. Where the client obtains the necessary
funds is unimportant. It could be from voluntary insurance,
compulsory insurance, governmental assistance, employer pro-
vision, governmental benefits, or directly from the provider
in the form of charity. Client use refers to the equality of
access one has at an institution, and is closely related to
client access. This characteristic is asking whether equality
in use exists and whether the use is adjusted for individual
client need. Client dignity is relatively self explanatory.
How the client is personally treated once he gains access,
connected with the legal, ethical, and administrative safe-
guards that protect the patient, is the crux of this
19

characteristic. Responsiveness to the client simply means
the degree to which the facility adapts to the client's wishes
and desires. Freedom of choice is the ability the client has
to select health care from among available institutions; if
he/she does not like one facility, can he/she go to another
with equal ease?
In the provider oriented mode the research and training
characteristics are defined as the amount of research and
training generally being conducted at any given health care
facility. For the purposes of the model matrix, systems
that have complete facilities devoted to research and train-
ing are not considered to be conducting research and train-
ing in a hospital, although they are undeniably closely
related. However, that a system has these specialized insti-
tutions will be taken into consideration for the purpose of
separating those that are engaged in research and training
to a similar degree. Professional judgment means the extent
to which the provider has the freedom to practice medicine
without regard to other factors. Quality of care, while
notoriously difficult to measure, is interpreted as the care
provided; without regard to costs. Provider compensation
is the extent a facility/system considers provider remunera-
tion as an important factor. Facility control is the measure




In the organizationally oriented mode, the concepts of
efficiency, profit, and organization survival are closely
related; indeed, they are interdependent, especially in a
proprietary system, or a nonprofit system with proprietary
behavior
.
Constraints on the Model
The CO/CEO determination model should not be applied to
a health care facility that stands in isolation. It should
be remembered that this model is best applied to those health
care facilities that are a subsystem of a larger system, that
is, those facilities that are subject to the overall guidance
and direction of a larger entity. For example, the Navy
clinic at Treasure Island in San Francisco Bay is a subsystem
of the Naval Regional Medical Center (NRMC) at Oakland, Ca.
,
which, in turn, is a subsystem of the Navy Medical Department.
These health care facilities that are part of a larger
system do not grow or develop independently of the larger
systems of which they are a part. The goals toward which the
larger system strives may dictate the general direction that
the subsystem takes, whether those goals are profit, self-
preservation, political, growth, or whatever. The chain-of-
command or organizational structure of the larger systems
may dictate or constrain changes in the identity of the sub-
system hospital CO/CEO—especially when rank and pay determine




Before any analysis was attempted, it was felt that a
brief description of each of the participating organizations
would provide better insight into their underlying structures.
The institutions were divided into three separate categories:
(1) proprietary, (2) nonprofit, and (3) governmental.
Proprietary
The proprietary category includes Hospital Corporation
of America (HCA) , Humana, Inc., Lifemark, Inc., and National
Medical Enterprises (NME) . A representative organizational
diagram appears in Figure 1.
The organizational structure employed by Hospital Corpora-
tion of America is a straightforward one and is assumed to
be fairly representative^of a health care system that is pro-
prietary in nature. This assumption, in conjunction with
the fact that organizational diagrams of the other three
previously mentioned proprietary corporations were not avail-
able, should be remembered by the reader. However, the analy-
sis section of this paper will reveal corporate .
interorganizational differences, as well as attitudinal
differences of the corporation executives, that were obtained
through questionnaires.
There are certain characteristics of proprietary hospitals
that make them readily distinguishable from other multihospital
22

groups [Takich & Darr, 1978]:
1. They are not necessarily or totally owned by physicians
2. They employ corporate staffs trained in management
skills.
3. They raise their capital through issuance of stocks
and bonds
.
These investor owned companies are publicly accountable for
profits and losses; therefore, economy, efficiency, incentive
to provide attractive services, effort and incentive on the
part of the personnel, and responsiveness to the consumer
are of the utmost importance. It should be pointed out that
these attributes will be evident in a profit making sense;
the facility will be responsive so long as the consumer can
absorb the costs. Because the sole interest of the stock-
holder lies in earning the highest possible rate of return
on his or her investment in that organization [Wood, 1975]
,
the very survival of the organization depends upon its being
able to make a profit. Assiiming that the consumer has free-
dom of choice, he or she will not patronize a particular
institution if a certain level of satisfaction or utility
is not gained.
HCA
There are two physicians currently listed as corporate
executives for HCA. One is the President and Chief Operating
Officer, while the other is Vice Chairman and Chief Medical
Officer (Figure 1) . Both were among the original founders




















All Foreign Facilities All Domestic Facilities
Figure 1. Organizational Structure of the Hospital Corpora-
tion of America
Chief Medical Officer position must, by its very nature, be
filled by a physician. The President and Chief Operating
Officer position will probably be filled by a nonphysician
when the incumbent vacates the position.
Hospital Corporation of America is a leading operator of
proprietary hospitals, nearly all of them general acute-care
facilities. HCA owns or leases 105 hospitals in the U.S. and
Australia for a total capacity of 17,000 beds. HCA also
manages 43 other facilities for other owners, such as munici-
pal governments, religious orders, and others [Value Line,
May 23, 1980]. In leading financial publications, such as
24

Value Line Investment Survey {May 23, 1980] and Moody's Hand-
book of Common Stocks [Summer, 1980] , one finds such descrip-
tive phrases as " . . .is maintaining its powerful earnings
momentum," "This stock is a good choice. . ." [Value Line
May 23, 1980, p. 1284] , "Reflecting improved productivity. . ."
and "Continued growth can be expected. . ." [Moody's, pages
unnumbered] . Hospital Corp. of America is clearly a leader
in proprietary hospital circles and appears to be quite suc-
cessful at its business.
Humana, Inc
.
Humana is a leading hospital management company. It
operates 93 acute-care general hospitals and one psychiatric
hospital, providing a total of over 16,000 beds. The hospi-
tals are located in the U.S., Switzerland, and England. Value
Line [May 23, 1980] says Humana 's earnings growth lately has
been phenomenal and the stock has excellent upward momentum.
Moody's [Summer, 1980] said Humana is in an excellent position
for further gains. Although Humana is not as old as HCA, it
appears to be just as successful and well managed,
Lifemark, Inc
.
Lifemark owns or leases 17 general hospitals, represent-
ing some 1900 beds in service. It also manages 18 other
hospitals, provides ancillary services to 52 client hospitals,
and operates 17 dental laboratories. Lifemark 's facilities
are wholly in the U.S. Value Line [May 23, 1980] said Life-
mark's earnings are up, admissions are up, physician
25

recruiting is up, and the corporation plans to double its
size within five years. Although not as large as HCA or
Humana, Lifemark is successful and appears to be well managed.
National Medical Enterprises, Inc
.
NME owns and operates 30 general hospitals which repre-
sents 3,900 beds, most of them in California. It manages
17 other hospitals under contract, operates 113 nursing homes,
distributes hospital equipment and supplies, and provides
respiratory therapy services at 60 client hospitals. NME is
a total health-care company. In addition, the government of
Saudi Arabia selected the company to provide management con-
sulting, personnel recruitment, purchasing, and other services
for some of its health care facilities over a 5 year period.
This was the fourth such contract for NME [Value Line, May
23, 1980]. Moody's and Value Line both have nothing but
positive comments on this corporation. NME, like the other
proprietary health care organizations mentioned, appears to
be well managed as well as successful.
Nonprofit Hospitals
This category includes Kaiser Foundation Hospital of San
Francisco (KFHSF) and Stanford University Medical Center
(SUMO
.
"Many of the nonprofit forms of organization are also
profit-oriented in that they frequently engage in aggressive
investment policies that increase their capital holdings.
26

The issue, of course, is not whether profits exist, but to
what extent, but the consequences of profit-oriented motives
on the workings of the system." [Mechanic, 1972, p. 26] Most
nonprofit, nongovernmental hospitals have characteristics that
are common to all of them, the main difference being in owner-
ship and control [MacEachern, 1957] . This category of health
care institution is comprised of, but not limited to, church
hospitals, fraternal hospitals, community hospitals, nonprofit
corporate hospitals, and university teaching hospitals. The
last two listed in this category are really variations of
community hospitals. These institutions get their financial
support from fees of paying patients, earnings of departments,
gifts, donations, endowments, government grants without govern-
ment control, and prepaid health plans provided by an employer
for his or her employees [MacEachern, 1957]
.
Over the past several years, many instituions that would
fall into this category have been endeavoring to achieve bet-
ter management/purchasing economics by making a contract with
another hospital organization, such as the investor-owned
Hospital Corp. of America. Financial pressures usually cause
this mixing of profit and nonprofit organizations. The non-
proprietary hospital hopes that the contract will result in
economics, such as mass purchasing, tighter controls, and
clearer accountability. On accountability it has been sug-
gested that doctors, who make many of the cost decisions in
a nonprofit hospital, understand that they are accountable
27

to management in the investor-owned hospital, whereas the
accountability in a nonprofit system gets diluted or dissolved
"in the muddy currents of the trustee-staff-administrator
relationship in a nonprofit system" [Rakich & Darr, p. 72].
Kaiser Foundation Hospital of San Francisco
KFHSF is but one facility of the parent organization.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. Originally organized in
1933 to provide health care services to Kaiser employees,
the system has evolved into a nationwide health care plan
that accommodates non-Kaiser patients as well as plan mem-
bers. Kaiser hospitals are intended to operate as true com-
munity hospitals. Presently, there are seven regions within
the overall Kaiser system; this represents 29 hospitals and
6,295 beds. The hospitals range in size from 50 to 628 beds.
Additionally, Kaiser is in a cooperative effort in an eighth
region in Dallas, Texas, with a major third party insurer
[KFHSF interview, July 1980 J . The Kaiser-Permanente Medical
Care Program is the largest comprehensive, prepaid, group
practice health delivery program in the United States. Many
authorities in the health care field believe the Kaiser mode
of health care delivery offers definite advantages over the
traditional fee-for-service physician practice of independent,
uncoordinated hospitals. One of the most highly regarded
characteristics of the program is the fact that subscribers
prepay fixed dues in return for a package of definitely
available services; this per capita, fixed sum, prepayment
28

feature is seen as an incentive to economy and efficiency
[Bower & Christensen, 1978] . Kaiser Foundation Hospital
of San Francisco is but one of the previously mentioned 29
hospitals in the Kaiser system. It serves the San Francisco
Bay and Northern California areas, and can be considered to
be typical of a Kaiser hospital [KFHSF interview, July 1980],
Figure 2 shows the organizational structure of the Kaiser
system to include KFHSF. The reason that Figure 2 shows
practically the entire organizational structure rather than
just to the CEO level is because the Kaiser structure is so
different from others in this paper. This difference will
be elaborated in the analysis section of this paper.
KFHSF, while being a nonproft hospital of the KFH system,
is a facility that has proprietary-like characteristics. The
Kaiser system is considered to be one of the most efficient
of its type [Bower & Christensen, 1978].
Originally designed as a Kaiser employee only, health care
system, the plan was opened to the San Francisco Bay area
public in 1945. By 1947, the system had spread to Oregon and
was serving nearly 25,000 members {Bower & Christensen, 1978].
By the early 1950s, Kaiser operations had attained such size
that it required outside debt financing.
The program had borrowed $4.5 million to build new medical
centers in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The reorganization
of the plan's management system was essential in order to












































































into three separate corporations designed to work as a teajn:
a Health Plan Corporation, a Permanente Medical Group, and a
Hospitals Corporation.
The Health Plan Organization's function was to integrate
the other elements. The plan contracted with members to pro-
vide health services for fixed monthly dues, negotiated a
contract with the medical group physicians to provide the
professional medical services, and the plan contracted with
the nonprofit Hospitals Corporation to provide the necessary
facilities and ancillary services. This organizational system
is illustrated in Figure 3 [Bower & Christensen, 1978J
.
The responsibility of the Permanente Medical Group was
to provide the professional services of physicians necessary
to assure the contracted for benefits of the Health plan
members. The Medical Group was organized as a for-profit





^.Membership ^ , Medical Services
}JU-
Health Plan Medical Groups
Figure 3. Intraorganizational Structure of the Kaiser Triad
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The Hospitals Corporation owned and managed the facili-
ties of the Kaiser system. Although the Health Plan and
the Hospitals Corporations are different legally, they share
the same board of directors. It should be noted that Kaiser
physicians had no customary active staff privileges at the
hospitals, that is to say they had no special employment or
other contractual relationship with the hospital [Bower &
Christensen, 1978]
.
Each of the Kaiser regions is jointly managed by two men:
a regional manager who is the regional chief executive for
the Health Plan and the hospitals, and a medical director who
is the chief executive for the region's Medical Group. The
regional manager has reporting to him a health plan manager
and a regional hospital administrator. Both of these are
usually nonphysicians. It so happens that as of this writing
the regional medical center administrator of the Northern
California region is an MD. However, this is an exception
as all other regional administrators are not physicians.
Stanford University Medical Center (SUMC)
SUMC is a singular institution; that is, SUMC is not
a part of a larger health care organization (Figure 4)
.
However, it is part of Stanford University and is subject
to its overall guidance. All general operations concerning
the medical center are formulated and executed within the
hospital proper. SUMC is an acute-care general hospital
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of about 180,000 patient days. Cardio-vascular surgery
—
specifically heart transplants—and radiation therapy are
the Center's specialties. Additionally, SUMC played a key
role in the development of the linear accelerator for medical
use. This development was done with Stanford University
[SUMC interview, August 1980J
.
SUMC's patient draw comes from an estimated 10-mile radius
of the hospital. While the majority of the patients are from
the immediate area, there is an international draw to the
hospital's heart and radiation specialties. The international
patients who seek SUMC's specialized care are primarily treated
by SUMC physicians while the local populus is treated by local
physicians who have practicing privileges at SUMC. The Stan-
ford University physicians are primarily involved in research
and very unusual or specialized cases.
As a hospital that is organizationally isolated from
another health care system, one might conclude that SUMC
should not be evaluated under this paper's CO/CEO determina-
tion model. However, the reader is reminded that SUMC is
part of the Stanford University system and as such is sub-
ject to the university's overall guidance. SUMC therefore,
qualifies for analysis because it is part of a larger system,
albeit health care is only one part of that system's function.
One of the primary purposes of SUMC is to provide a
teaching or research environment for the faculty physicians
thus providing a learning environment for students in
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medicine and allied science studies. In isolation, this
fact could easily lead one to conclude that SUMC should fall
into the provider-oriented mode of the CE/CEO model because
research, teaching, and learning are characteristic descrip-
tors of that mode. However, these three descriptors do not
fully describe all of the functions of SUMC,
Although SUMC is a university hospital that is used as
a teaching tool, it also functions as a community hospital
for the immediate area. Local physicians are offered prac-
ticing privileges by SUMC in order to provide an up-to-date
facility for area residents. These facilities are provided
on a fee-for-service basis from the patient or a third-party
insurer. This added income helps offset the expenses of the
center while providing a state-of-the-art facility to the
local population. While a certain number of the beds at the
hospital are always kept available for faculty research and
teaching, the majority of the beds is for general use [SUMC
interview, August, 1980].
Governmental Health Care Facilities
This category is made up of the Veterans' Administration
Hospital of San Francisco, the Public Health Service Hospital
of San Francisco, and U.S. Naval health care facilities. No
specific Naval health delivery system was selected because
all of the major facilities are organized in the same manner;
therefore, the organization structure as outlined in the
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Manual of the Medical Department was relied upon as being
representative of a single major facility.
The Federal Government provides funds, in the form of a
budget, to all Federal health care facilities. In addition,
the Federal Government is heavily involved in financing the
care of the population at other than Federal facilities
through programs, such as Medicare. This heavy financial
involvement in health care causes the Federal Government to
wield a profound influence upon all those that benefit from
its programs and facilities, either directly or indirectly.
In government hospitals, the always present danger of
political interference can materially affect efficiency and
increase costs. The ideal situation would be to use govern-
ment funds, but not have government control, thereby eliminat-
ing the possibility of political interference. This could be
done by placing facilities under the management control of a
board of trustees who can act independently of any political
organization and who are free from political domination
[MacEachern, 1957]
.
Federal health care facilities represent a huge "pork bar-
rel" from which political constituents can draw benefits,
making the possibility of a Federal sector hospital being
free from politics remote at best. As long as Federal funds
are used, there will probably also be the element of politi-
cal domination present, and, as long as there is political
domination, so will there also be interest groups at the
forefront of that domination.
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Veterans' Administration Hospital (VAH). of San Francisco (VAHSF )
The VAH system consists of 172 acute-care general hospi-
tals located within six national regions. The hospitals range
in size from 120 to 1300 beds.
The VAH system has a total of 84,400 beds, making it one
of the largest health care systems in the world. The VAHSF
complex is a 440-bed general medical and surgical facility
that is affiliated with the University of California in a
teaching capacity. The VAH system exists to serve Veterans*
Administration beneficiaries. Other categories of patients
are reviewed on an individual basis and may be accepted on
a space-available basis. VA hospitals are federally funded
on a yearly budget basis [VAHSF interview, July 1980] . The
organizational structure of the VAH system down to VAHSF is
shown in Figure 5.
VA hospitals are controlled and operated by the VA through
its director, who is not a physician (Figure 5) . The director
of VA medicine, however, is a physician—as are most of the
top level executives of the VA medical system at the VA head-
quarters in Washington, D.C. This is prevalent in all govern-
mental health systems and is probably the result of established
tradition as well as the influence of groups such as the
American Medical Association (AMA) {VAHSF interview, July 1980] .
Public Health Service (PHS) Hospital San Francisco (PHSHSF)
The PHS health care system is also a federally funded

















Figure 5. Organizational Structure of the Veterans'
Administration Health Care System
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civilians in the U.S. Merchant Marine, the U.S. Coast Guard,
and other members of the uniformed services along with their
dependents. Additionally, American Indians under the cogni-
zance of the Bureau of Indian Affairs are entitled to treat-
ment at PHS facilities. The PHS also grants care to others
on a need and space available basis . The PHS health care
system consists of eight hospitals nationwide. They operate
outpatient clinics and one special hospital for Hansen's
disease. PHSHSF is responsible for a a five state area in-
cluding California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and Hawaii. It
is a medium-sized facility of approximately 300 beds and is
endeavoring to broaden its operational scope commensurate
with available funds; as the entire PHS health care system
is. Although the U.S. Merchant Marine has declined in
strength in recent years, the PHS must keep a large number
of beds available for contingency purposes. The excess re-
sources are currently being used to provide health care to
the refugees from Cuba, Indo-China, and others as Congress
may direct. The PHS system of organization is shown in
Figure 6
.
Of all the health care systems this paper takes under
consideration, the PHSH system resembles the U.S. Navy's
the most; even to the uniforms PHS officers wear. PHS of-
ficers even have the same rank structure as Naval officers,
albeit PHS uses the civil service pay system while the Navy
uses the DOD system.
3S
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The United States Navy Medical Department
The USN Medical' Department has been in existence in one
form or another since the very beginnings of the Navy itself,
which in turn goes back to the beginnings of the United States
as a nation. The Medical Department of the Navy is composed
of commands and facilities devoted to providing health care
services. It -includes the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
Naval Regional Medical Centers (NRMC) , Naval Hospitals, and
medical departments of ships and stations throughout the world.
The Navy Medical Department exists to serve Navy and Marine
Corps personnel and their dependents, retired members and their
dependents. Federal civilian employees, and others as authorized
by law [Manual of the Medical Department, 31 Oct. 73, Change
80] . The Navy Medical Department consists of a total of 807
medical facilities which is comprised of 240 fixed medical
treatment facilities, such as hospitals and clinics, and 567
nonfixed medical treatment facilities, such as shipboard sick-
bays. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units. Construc-
tion Battalions (CB's), and other mobile units. The average
daily patient load for Naval medical treatment facilities was
4,613 in 1976. In addition, there were 14,301,283 outpatient
visits in 1976, excluding dental procedures [Medical Statistics,
U.S. Navy, 1976]. Funds for Naval health care are provided by
Congress by way of the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy





















IV. ANALYSIS OF FACILITIES AND SYSTEMS
Overview
The analysis of the facilities and systems included in
this paper is based upon the orientation modes of the CO/CEO
determination model, which, in turn, is based upon the organi-
zational structure and priorities of the facilities and systems
themselves. In order to determine which orientational mode
each of the facilities/systems would best fit, the CO/CEO de-
termination model matrix was devised (Table 1)
.
The matrix is divided into the three orientational modes
previously referred to in the methodology chapter of this
paper. The three modes are further subdivided to include
their characteristics, also mentioned in the methodology
chapter.
As there are six facilities/systems being considered in
this paper, it was deciced that they would be ranked from 1
to 6, depending upon their relative strength in a given char-
acteristic. The scoring was done by the author. A score of
6 in a characteristic means that the respective facility/
system is strongest among the remaining facilities/systems
in that particular characteristic. Alternately, a score of
1 means that characteristic is at its lowest in its respective
facility/system among the other facility/systems.
The individual characteristics of each facility/system





































Research 1 2 6 3 4 5
Training 1 2 6 5 3 4
Professional
Judgment 1 2 3 4 5 6
Quality of
Care 1 3 2 4 5 6
Provider
Compensation 1 6 5 2 3 4
Facility
Control 1 2 3 4 5 6
TOTAL 6 17 25 22 25 31
ORGANIZATION ORIENTED
Efficiency 6 5 4 3 1 2
Profit 6 5 4 2 2 2




Matrix of the facilities/systems and their relative




of the facilities within each mode. For example. Table 1
shows that in the care oriented mode, the Navy, with a score
of 20, is the most care oriented system, relative to the
others on the table, while the proprietaries, at 15, are the
least care oriented. On the other hand, these positions are
reversed in the organization mode totals. The score of a
facility/system in any particular characteristic is not in-
tended to indicate the quantity of that characteristic for
that facility/system. Rather, the characteristic score is
simply a relative ranking across all facilities/systems. As
an example, the profit characteristic of the organizational-
oriented mode indicates that the governmental systems all have
score of 2 indicating that they are tied or equal for the
lowest score for that characteristic on the matrix. This means
that, of all the facilities/systems being considered, the
governmentals have the least profit characteristic. Actually,
it is generally known that governmental health care facilities
have no profit characteristic whatsoever; but, as the sum of
the row scores must be the sum of all natural numbers from 1
through 6, a score of zero is precluded for any characteristic.
While the matrix in Table 1 will be used for the anlysis
of how each facility/system fits into the different modes and
their characteristics, the profiles graphed in Figures 8, 9,
and 10 will be the basis for an overall comparison of the
Navy system as opposed to the other governmentals, nonprofits,
and proprietaries, respectively. The overall profile analysis
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will permit an illustrative comparison with which the reader
can see how the Navy contrasts with the other facilities/
systems across all modes and characteristics.
Scoring for the matrix and the subsequent graphs is
based on information obtained and determined during the re-
search phase of this thesis and summarized in the preceding
section.
Medical Care Oriented Mode
The Navy system, with a score of 20 out of a possible 30,
ranks highest as a care-oriented system. Alternately, the
proprietary systems ranked lowest at 15. It is interesting
to note that the six facilities/systems fell into essentially
two groups, both intrarelated.
Although the two nonprofit hospitals were rated slightly
higher than the proprietaries, the matrix indicates they are
closely related. This is because the nonprofit hospitals
enagage in practices that are similar to those of the pro-
prietary sector; namely, the constant acquisition of real
estate and capital goods. Both KFH and SUMC also offset opera-
tional costs by providing care to anyone on a fee-for-service
basis. Thus, the low scores in access and use for the pro-
prietary and the nonprofit hospitals. The government hospitals
score high in these categories because virtually everone who
is eligible for care will be treated without regard to costs.
In the same vein, KFH scored highest among the nongovernment
group because of its obligation to its prepaid members; but,
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the motive to keep costs to a minimum also forces the low
group to limit care to those who are able to pay for, or in
the case of SUMC, will provide an academically interesting
case. The Navy is rated highest in access and use because
its beneficiaries are most easily identified among the high
group. Those eligible for VAH or PHSH care make up a wide
spectrum of beneficiaries while the Navy's beneficiaries
come from the relatively limited military group.
Concerning client dignity and freedom of choice, the Navy
ranks lowest and the proprietaries highest. These two char-
acteristics are closely related because if a client is not
treated with dignity and he/she has freedom of choice, he/she
will probably choose another facility. On the other hand, if
the client does not have freedom of choice, he/she will have
to endure any indignities given, unless the care is not abso-
lutely necessary, in which case the client only has the option
of staying or leaving. The governmental facilities rank lowest
as a group here, with the Navy the lowest group. Generally
speaking. Navy beneficiaries have no alternatives where VA
and PHS beneficiaries may be insured through employers and
the like, thus making them eligible for care at a different
facility. VA ranks higher than PHS in this category because
PHS beneficiaries include medical indigents, such as American
Indians and refugees, and as such, are probably less likely
to have alternative plans. They are also less likely to demand
dignified treatment. Among the high group, the proprietaries
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rank highest because their clentele are paying for care at a
direct fashion; therefore, they could also pay for care at a
different facility with equal ease. This forces the proprie-
taries to please the client, lest they lose profitable busi-
ness. SUMC outranks KFH here because the bulk of its patient
load comes from the local population in a proprietary fashion.
Kaiser, on the other hand, has a prepaid client that must use
the KFH system. The fact that KFH accepts paying customers
from outside the health plan in the same manner as the pro-
prietaries, and that KFH must offer some degree of dignity to
keep the prepaying contracts from year to year, separates them
from the governmentals in these two categories.
Responsiveness to the wishes and desires of clients is
most likely to come from the governmental group and least
likely to come from the proprietaries because the governmental
hospitals will endeavor to grant wishes and desires to the
extent their budget permits, whereby the proprietaries will
be least responsive in this category due to the profit motive.
The proprietaries will provide the least the client will
tolerate and the governmentals will provide the most they are
able to afford. The proprietaries will exceed the governmen-
tals only when the client is willing to bear the additional
cost. The prepaid nature of Kaiser makes it most like the
government hospitals; accordingly, it is ranked highest among
the nongovernmental facilities. Stanford exceeds the pro-
prietaries because SUMC has a teaching function and, as such,
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will provide care to medically interesting cases regardless
of ability to pay, at least to the extent the medical center
is able to absorb the costs.
Health Care Provider Oriented Modes
Among all facilities/systems considered, the Navy rated
highest as a provider oriented system, while the proprietaries
rated lowest. As Table 1 shows, the difference between the
two is maximal.
The proprietaries ranked lowest here because they are rela-
tively devoid of any research or training, and they are totally
devoid of any facilities controlled by a provider; to wit, none
of the proprietaries have any physicians as a facility CEO.
Professional judgment in a proprietary system is limited to
what the provider is actually qualified to do; namely, medical
care. All else is decided by managers, even to the extent
that it may infringe upon a provider's course of treatment
decision, if there is an alternate course available that is
sufficiently effective and less expensive. Provider compensa-
tion is not important in the proprietaries because they do
not normally employ physicians. They provide a hospital in
which local physicians are granted practicing privileges.
When providers are employed in some capacity, it is assumed
their remuneration will be at the lowest possible level con-
sistent with attracting the potential employee, as this is
the economically prudent action. Further, the level of re-
muneration is most likely to be determined by compensation
specialists rather than the providers themselves.
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The Navy ranked highest in the provider oriented mode.
Although individual facilities may not be heavily involved in
research and training, most are to some degree. Also, the
Navy is involved in entire facilities that are devoted strictly
to research or training, such as the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology, and the Armed Forces Research Institute for research
purposes; and, the Uniformed Services University of Health Sci-
ences for training purposes. The professional judgement of a
Navy provider is unquestioned, and is limited only by what the
budget will bear. Even the budget is no object in special
cases, where the facility can request additional funding from
BUMED. Quality of care in the Navy is of paramount importance
and is subject to the same constraints as the professional
judgment of the provider. Provider compensation is of high
importance in the Navy medical system. A Navy physician is
eligible to receive additional remuneration over and above
what a comparably graded administrator receives. Also, the
request to Congress for special pays and bonuses for Navy
providers is drafted by physicians, and they determine the
amount of the additional pays and bonuses that will be re-
quested. These requests are limited only by what the market
(Congress, OSD, and the President) will bear. Facility control
in the Navy is provider dominated. All Navy Regional Medical
Centers are commanded by physicians, most executive level po-
sitions in BUMED are physician occupied, and medical facilities
not commanded by physicians are subcommands of a larger
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physician-commanded system [Appropriations Committee on
Defense, 1980].
SUMC deserves special mention in the provider oriented
mode because it ranks second to the Navy, in conjunction with
PHSH. While this may appear inconsistent with a system that
has proprietary habits, it is not totally out of character,
SUMC is research and training heavy; and, provider compensa-
tion ranks second to Kaiser because it is necessary to have
a high level of pay to attract the talent necessary to operate
a university medical teaching and research system. Facility
control while dominated by administrators at the hospital level
is, in reality, in the hands of providers at the university
level. It appears as though the management of the facility
is left to the managers, while the general direction— in the
clinical sense—of the hospital is determined by the providers.
The mangers must adjust their priorities to accommodate that
direction.
Both the PHSH system and the Navy are heavily involved
in training, albeit not to the extent of the VAH, at least on
the individual facility level. Their basic participation in
this mode characteristic is in local university teaching co-
operation. The sheer number of VAH facilities cooperating
with local institutions of higher learning justifies the VAH
ranking here. The higher relative ranking in the research
category for the Navy is a result of its worldwide research
effort in all types of medicine. The PSHS system, while sig-
nificant, does not have as large a scope.
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Kaiser is rated highest in provider compensation because
the Permanente Medical Group (PMG) part of the Kaiser triad
is a for-profit corporation. This is as opposed to the non-
profit status of the hospitals and the health plan. Kaiser
physicians determine their own pay consistent with the health
plan's ability to meet that determination. Also, any unspent
budget funds at the end of the fiscal year are divided among
the physicians and the other Kaiser entities. Provider con-
trol in a Kaiser hospital is limited to the clinical aspects;
all else comes under the administrator's cognizance. Profes-
sional judgment in a KFH hospital is unquestioned, but limited
to budget constraints. A Kaiser provider knows that the more
he/she saves, the more he/she will receive as a saving bonus
at year's end. That incentive is conspicuously absent from
the other systems. The research and training characteristics
of the KFH system are limited to providing a consistent through-
put of new physicians to keep the PMG vacancies full and to
keeping staff physicians current in state-of-the-art medicine.
Organizational Oriented Mode
The governmental hospitals ranked lowest among the group
in this mode, with the Navy as the absolute low. This was
not unexpected, primarily because of the profit characteristic.
Governmental hospitals are in the business of expending funds
rather than taking them in.
Predictably, the proprietaries scored highest in this mode,
in all characteristics. As previously mentioned, the efficiency.
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profit, and organizational survival characteristics of the
organizationally oriented mode are extremely interdependent
in proprietary and proprietary-like nonprofit systems. This
explains the identical characteristic scores arrived at in
the proprietary and the nonprofit columns. As the proprie-
taries are the only hospitals among the entire group that
are stated for-profit corporations, and because profit, ef-
ficiency, and survival are so closely related, the proprie-
taries have to be rated as the most organizationally oriented.
The proprietary nature of the nonprofit KFH and Stanford
hospitals causes them to be ranked directly below the pro-
prietaries in this mode. This is based upon their official
nonprofit status.
That KFH is rated higher than SUMC is primarily attribua-
ble to their respective source of funds. The Kaiser system
must obtain operating funds through their prepaid health plan,
and other nonmembers who arbitrarily elect to use a Kaiser
hospital in lieu of any other, SUMC, on the other hand, pro-
cures its funds by allowing the local population to use its
facilities on a fee-for-service basis; also, SUMC has access
to university funds, not to mention government research grants,
endowments, and other charitable type contributions. Thus,
the survival of SUMC is not wholly dependent upon its own





Among the governmental hospitals / efficiency measurement
is a difficult concept. How does one decide whether a govern-
mental hospital is efficient? If their budgets and its exe-
cution are the yardstick, should the fact that a hospital
spent more or less than was originally appropriated be con-
sidered? If a facilty spends less than it has the right to,
it is likely that the succeeding budget will be reduced by
the amount previously saved. Any incentive to operate ef-
ficiently is practically nonexistent for this type of system.
If a facility spends more than is originally appropriated,
it must request additional funding from its parent organiza-
tion. While this may be frowned upon in official circles,
it may also be used as justification for a larger budget the
following year. If a facility completes its fiscal year with-
out over or under spending, it appears as though it has
achieved efficiency. The facility has done exactly what it
said it was going to do, and therefore, must be well managed.
The formulation of a budget, in this sense, is more important
than any other phase.
It was, therefore, decided that some measurement of who
a hospital's clients are, connected with how a hospital uses
its health care professionals, would be the best measure of
efficiency. The former relates to client dignity, client
autonomy, and the prevalence of the client group's influence
and power. The latter refers to the extent a hospital uses
its health care professionals in the same manner as the
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civilian sector, where efficiency is more easily quantifiable,
not to mention of more importance.
In a PHS hospital, the client's lack of freedom of choice
and dignity are conspicuously present. Among its users, the
merchant marine is probably the most organized and affluent.
The Indians, refugees, and the remainder, are for the most
part unorganized and indigent. It is felt that mariner's or-
ganizations, such as the dockworkers union, would have con-
siderable political power and could bring pressure to bear
to forego any adverse action that might result because of fa-
cility inefficiency. Further, the fact that PHS hospitals
use physicians in administrative positions while paying them
physician wages, rather than the opposite proprietary practice,
points to further inefficiency.
A Naval health care facility is similar to a PHS facility
in that their health care professionals are used in much the
same manner as the PHS. That Congress can wreak its will upon
the Navy to force an efficiency of sorts is attributable to
the fact that the Navy's clients, while being somewhat more
affluent, are generally less powerful than PHS clients because
formal unions and similar organizations are prohibited, thus
making the Navy beneficiary less of a political threat. It
is undeniable that Department of Defense funds are among the
first to be reduced during an austere budget year.
A VA hospital is most likely to be more efficient than
other government hospitals. Among the government group, the
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VA personnel practices are most like that of the proprietary
sector. Administrative jobs are usually handled by administra-
tors; clinical jobs are handled by physicians; and, if a pro-
vider elects to stay in or go to administration, he/she must
forfeit any special provider remuneration receivable. Rela-
tively speaking, veteran's groups enjoy acceptable client
dignity and freedom of choice. While eligible for VA benefits,
most are otherwise employed and are most likely to have employer
sponsored health care benefits. As a group, veterans are or-
ganized into several different fraternal organizations. How-
ever, it is felt that because VA beneficiaries are a more
homogeneous group, rather than the mixture of indigents, refu-
gees, mariners, and what you that constitute the makeup of the
PHS clientel, the veterans are more apt to use their political
power to demand more efficiency, as opposed to holding back
Congressional retribution for inefficiency.
Among the governmental hospitals, the Navy should be the
least concerned with organizational survival. As long as there
is a Navy, there must also be a medical department to provide
health care to its members. That the organizational form of
the Navy Medical Department may change is not being argued.
Rather, it will exist in some form so long as the United States
has a Navy. If a system had to go, or be reduced, the PHS
would probably be the first system to lose its hospitals, if
for no other reason than the political power of the clients
involved. As a group, the governmental hospitals are relatively
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secure in their survival because the political consequences
of a system closure would probably be unbearable to those
responsible.
Overall Profile Analysis
Figure 8 depicts the relationship between the Navy system
and the other governmental systems. Predictably, the respective
graph lines have similar shapes, although the points occur at
different levels for all but the profit characteristic, and
the VAH line turns upward towards the training interest while
the Navy and PHS lines go downward. Otherwise, the three lines
are practically symmetrical.
The governmental systems are all funded in a similar fashion
and they also have what could be referred to as a captive cli-
entel in that their eligible beneficiaries are more apt to use
their respective facilities than bear the economic cost of using
a fee-for-service system. It appears as though patient eco-
nomics plays a large part in determining the demand on govern-
ment health care facilities. Eligible clients seem to be willing
to give up a large measure of dignity and freedom of choice in
return for a high degree of access, use, and responsiveness to
their needs and desires.
It is suspected that because governmental providers enjoy
systems that are physician oriented, they are willing to forego
wages to a certain extent. The nonmonetary aspects of a govern-
ment provider's wages make up for the relatively low wages he/





characteristic of the provider orientation mode among the
government facilities, albeit they are all close. This is a
possible explanation for the relative success of provider re-
cruiting and retention despite their relative low level of
remuneration.
Figure 9 is the graphical overlay of the Navy system as
opposed to the nonprofit hospitals. In contrast with Figure
8, Figure 9 shows the Navy at odds with the nonprofit hospi-
tals in most of the mode characteristics.
The Navy system is most like KFH in the care mode. This
is probably due to the captive client system that KFH and the
Navy system both enjoy. The fact that the real clients of
both systems have no choice, brings the systems closer together,
while the KFH practice of accepting anyone who can pay keeps
the systems apart.
In the provider mode , the Navy system m.ore closely re-
sembles SUMC. This is because of the training, research,
provider autonomy, and facility control that these two systems
enjoy. In this sense, KFH becomes more organizationally
oriented. Indeed, were it not for the PMG sector of Kaiser,
the KFH would probably be almost entirely organizationally
oriented.
The relative ranking for SUMC in the provider mode puts
it in a tie for second place position with PHSH, and just
below the Navy. That SUMC was the only nongovernment facility





to its similarity to the Navy's medical system in regards to
a system that is oriented toward the provider.
The stark contrast of the Navy system and the organiza-
tionally oriented proprietaries is readily evident in Figure
10. Of the fourteen characteristics of the three modes, not
one depicts these two systems as being even remotely similar.
The fact that a publicly owned corporation must consider
profit making for its stockholders as its primary objective
dictates that the proprietaries get the most from each cost
dollar.
In the care mode, only dignity and choice will cause the
proprietaries to increase their profits, as was previously
explained. Being care oriented in the other care characteris-
tics will only raise their costs. Therefore, these costs will
be kept to a minimum, consistent with good health care, and
to the degree that the facility will mot drive clients away.
The provider orientation mode of Figure 10 portrays the
largest difference between the Navy and the proprietaries.
Where the Navy is very strong in most of these mode characteris-
tics, the proprietaries are nonexistent. All of the provider
oriented characteristics represent opportunities to spend
money with little potential for profit. Providers are a scarce,
epxensive resource that consume other resources. Evidently,
the proprietaries have discovered that the most efficient man-





As previously statec3, efficiency and profit ensure sur-
vival in the proprietary sector. The stockholders demand for
a return on his/her investment dictate that a proprietary
hospital do whatever is necessary to ensure profits; thus,
survival. The Navy has no such problems with its funds pro-
curement. Although subject to budget cuts in austere years,
Congress will always appropriate the funds necessary for the
Navy to complete its mission, and the Navy's medical mission
is to spend money in support of the medical needs of the Navy
itself.
A naval medical facility will be as efficient as it has
to be, relative to the austerity of the fiscal budget. If
efficiency, profit, and survival were paramount to the Navy,
their system would logically resemble that of the proprietary





Careful examination of Table 1 reveals that the higher a
facility/system scores in the care oriented mode, the more
likely it is that the facility will have a physician CEO. If
a facility/system is care oriented, it will provide the best
care possible, within its budgetary limitations. Cost becomes
a secondary consideration in the care mode. This extreme of
the care mode is descriptive of hospitals that do not have to
raise their own funds, such as government hospitals.
Both PHSH and the Navy have high total scores in this
mode. In fact, they score very high in every characteristic
except dignity and choice, as was previously pointed out in
the analysis. Their doctrine of total access and use to all
eligible beneficiaries connected with responsiveness to the
wants and desires of their clients to create systems whereby
the quality of care is limited only by the budget, and even
that is negotiable through emergency funding from, the parent
organization. Such is the nature of cost overruns in the
Federal Government.
Systems that lean towards the care mode are almost always
physician dominated. Both the Navy and PHSH fit this descrip-
tion. While the VAHs are high in care orientation, they seem
to be tracking in a new direction. This will be discussed in
the final section of this chapter.
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The more cost conscious a facility becomes, the more apt
it is to have an administrator as the CEO. Proprietary sys-
tems and nonprofit hospitals, such as Kaiser and Stanford
certainly fit this description; accordingly, they are not
high in the care mode. As the score totals of the care mode
in Table 1 indicate, concern for efficiency is inversely re-
lated to each score; the lower the score, the more concern
for efficiency. The opposite is also true.
Provider Orientation Mode
The higher a facility scores in the provider mode, the more
likely it is to have a physician CEO. SUMC stands out as an
exception to this result, due primarily to the teaching and
research nature of Stanford's hospital. In spite of this high
provider mode score, SUMC still employs an administrator as
its CEO because it must raise its own funds to a large degree,
mandating an efficiency that is nat absolute, but adequate to
meet its needs.
It is clear that while one of the main purposes of SUMC
is the teaching of Stanford University medical students, it
achieves this purpose through the devotion of the bulk of
its resources to the local population's use in return for a
fee. This local population does not include the university
students, as the university has found it more profitable to
subcontract for the care of the students with another medical
entity. Where one might easily conclude that a facility of
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of this type would be provider oriented because of its research
and teaching functions. The facility is, in reality, a combi-
nation of provider and organizationally oriented under the
model because of its proprietary like practice of providing
health care for a fee to the general public, and because the
duties, responsibilities, and accountabilities of the CEO are
management and survival oriented.
The PHSH organizational system is dominated by physicians.
The Surgeon General of the United States is the PHS CEO. All
regional directors are physicians. All facility directors are
physicians, as are all of their deputy directors (Figure 5).
The closest any administrator comes to being anywhere near a
facility CEO position is the associate director of administra-
tion. In the absence of the CEO, the deputy becomes acting
CEO [PHS interview, July 1980]
.
As a provider care oriented system, the PHS works very
well. Physicians are accountable only to other physicians.
There is no interference from managers, as the system has
designed them out of any position with a respectable power
base. It is known that the physician is the central figure
in a hospital, for without his special skills and knowledge,
the hospital merely becomes another building. Indeed, the
most important function of a hospital is to treat patients,
and that task would be impossible without physicians [Opp,
1962] . Paul Opp, in his paper on hospital administration and
the medical staff, points out that some of the most frequent
66

sources of administrative-medical staff conflict are [Opp,
1962]
:
a. Physicians resent any type of control or direction
by anyone other than physicians.
b. Physicians resent any real or imagined encroachment
upon affairs considered by physicians to be purely
medical.
c. Physicians have feelings of superiority and want
freedom from administrative interference. They view
the administrator as a threat to their freedom and
superiority.
d. Physicians seem to think that the hospital exists
entirely for them rather than the patient. They
tend to forget that the hospital is for the patient.
e. Physicians have an "omniscience complex" which
causes resentment in underlings.
As the PHSH system has no administrators with any real
authority, the physicians of the PHS system should feel rela-
tively free from interference by administrators. The direc-
tor of PHSHSF states that he believes that only physicians
can effectively relate to other physicians on hospital mat-
ters and that in his opinion, physicians make the best CEO's,
regardless of management function [PHSHSF interview, July
1980] . The PHSHSF CEO said that he felt that many of the PHS
physicians would quit if the career path to CEO were opened
to administrators rather than physicians because the opportu-
nity to be CEO enhanced their overall compensation [PHSHSF
interview, July 1980] . One must ask at this point whether the
PHS physician would accept the CEO position in lieu of special
physician pay as previously discussed in the VA section of
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this paper. Further, if a physician does quit because he or
she is no longer eligible to be a facility CEO, one must also
ask whether the system will not function more efficiently be-
cause it is less expensive to hire an administrator rather
than a physician as a CEO, not to mention the opportunity costs
of having a physician in management and the fact that adminis-
trators are better qualified to be a hospital CEO because of
their experience and educational background.
The accountabilities of a PHSH CEO are to other physicians
from the bottom of the organizational hierarchy to the top.
Physicians understand physicians better than anyone else; that
point in inarguable. Their education, desires, and priorities
are basically the same, thus making it easy for one to relate
to another regardless of their place in the hierarchy. This
is, of course, as opposed to a physician/administrator
relationship.
The organizational structure of the Navy Medical Department
is illustrated in Figure 6. As in the PHS system, it is also
dominated by physicians.
Of the 23 Naval Regional Medical Centers (NRMC) , not one
is commanded by other than a physician. Administrators of
the Medical Service Corps do command medical department fa-
cilities that are not clinical in nature, such as the Hospital
Corps School. They also command some of the smaller medical
facilities that are subcommands of a larger physician-commmanded
entity [House Appropriations Committee hearings, 1980].
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Also, the overwhelming majority of the higher executive
positions at BUMED are filled by physicians [BUMED Organiza-
tional Manual, 1980] , even though these positions are mana-
gerial in nature and should not require a physician's skills.
It appears that physicians occupy these positions because of
the organizational system rather than the skills required by
those positions.
Credence is lent to the belief that the Navy is provider
oriented when one discovers that in the midst of the highly
touted and much publicized "physician shortage" the Navy is
supposed to be experiencing, there are approximately 100 Navy
physicians (at any one time) that are in jobs that are pri-
marily administrative in nature [U.S. Senate, 1979]. Further,
all Navy physicians in these high administrative positions,
to include facility CO/CEO, are eligible to draw physicians'
inducement pay and/or variable incentive pay. Under currently
proposed legislation, this could amount to some $29,000 extra over
a comparably graded MSC officer of the health care administra-
tion section [Navy Times, 1980]. This figure does not take
into consideration the opportunity costs, recruitment costs,
and educational costs of utilizing a physician in administra-
tion when administrators are available.
Seventy-two different military medical facilities had to
curtail or completely eliminate some normally available ser-
vices to eligible beneficiaries during fiscal year 1978. The
service cutback covered some 12 different specialties
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[Congressional report, 1979] . Using the Navy as the model
and examining the Naval Hospital at Quantico, Va., this writer
has personal knowledge that while OB/GYN services were closed
at that facility, there was a board certified OB/GYN specialist
assigned to an administrative position at the Bureau of Medi-
cine and Surgery some 20-odd miles away. Additionally, the
cost difference between physicians and administrators grows
dramatically when recruitment costs of $5,000 to $6,000 per
physician and/or educational costs of $37,000 to $190,000 per
physician enrolled in a Navy sponsored program [Cost Effective
Analysis, 1976] are figured in to compensate for the new
physician who must be brought on board to replace that physi-
cian who is out of clinical medicine and into executive
medicine.
As in the PHS system, the Navy CO/CEO of a major health
care facility will be replaced by the Chief of Clinical Ser-
vices rather than the Chief of Administrative Services when
the CO/CEO is unable to be present (Figure 6) [MAN MED Chapt.
11], The Navy CO/CEO sees his duties, responsibilities, and
accountabilities as provider oriented; and rightfully so be-
cause he is a provider who is striving to keep his institution
within the organizational framework of a provider oriented
system.
The Navy's heavy involvement in research and education
offers further evidence that its system is provider oriented.
Institutions, such as the Armed Forces Institue of Pathology
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and the Armed Forces Research Institute are world famous for
their research efforts and accomplishments. Educational pro-
grams that subsidize health profession students, and the
recently establishment of a medical school that exists solely
to provide physician input for the Armed Forces (United States
University of Health Sciences) are referred to. As pointed
out in an earlier section of this paper, committment to re-
search and education are two of the primary characteristics
of the health care provider oriented system.
Organization Oriented Mode
The proprietary systems stand as the ultimate example of
a system that is organizationally oriented. Their very ex-
istance depends upon success in this mode.
There are those who argue that the profit motive debases
the system, distorts priorities, leads to exploitation of the
poor and powerless, and encourages unnecessary resource pro-
liferation. The issue is not whether profits stimulate abuse
or exploitative behavior, as they may often do; rather, it
is necessary to consider whether the anticipated gains that
result from the profit incentive outweight these abuses.
It is assximed that those people who elect to patronize
a for-profit health care institution do so of their own free
will. They are paying for that health care either directly
or through a third party insurer, rather than being told what
organization or institution they must go to becuse their care
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was being subsidized by the government or had been previously
contracted for by their employer. If the proprietary hospital
is making a sustained profit, then it is, to a certain degree,
both successful and efficient. It has fulfilled its obliga-
tion to its share owners while providing a measure of satis-
factory health care to those that must bear the cost of that
care.
If the proprietaries are indeed the most efficient, one
must ask what factor causes them to be that way. In the con-
text of this paper, the four proprietaries were asked what
practices they used in regard to determining who a hospital
CO/CEO should be.
HCA reported that it was not necessary for a hospital CEO
to be a physician, that none of its hospital CEOs are pro-
viders, and that their CEO's duties are managerial in nature
[HCA communication, July 1980] .
Humana, Inc. , reported that it is not necessary for the
CEO of a hospital to be a provider, that none of its hospital
CEOs are physicians, that the CEO position is managerial in
nature, that none of its corporate executives are physicians,
and that administrators make the best CEOs [Humana communica-
tion, July 1980] .
Lifemark, Inc., reported that it is "absolutely not" nec-
essary for the CEO of a hospital to be a physician, that none
of its hospital CEOs are physicians, that the governmental
health providing agencies "use of MDs in administration" is
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a complete waste of an already scarce resource, that physi-
cians should be used only in roles requiring and MDs skills,
that trained administrators should be used in administrative
positions, that there is nothing in the education and train-
ing of a doctor that "in any way" prepares him to direct a
hospital organization, that generally speaking, non-MD ad-
ministrators do a decidedly better job than MDs in all respects
in administration, including staff relationships. Lifemark
went on to say that the military's use of physicians as
CO/CEOs
. . .
goes back many, many years to the time when
physicians were the Medical Corps (sic) , before hos-
pital administration as a profession was ever thought
about. With the advent of collegiate programs in
hospital administration, the opportunity presented
itself for the services to introduce trained admin-
istrators into the role of hospital and health facility
director, but the opportunity was refused. The MAC
(sic) was introduced, but MAC officers (Army) and
similar categories in other services were never pri-
vileged to assume the CEO role. The AMA, in par-
ticular, and vast corps of retired medical officers
carried sufficient weight to always forestall any
change in that direction. Since physicians occupy
all principal positions in the medical arms of all
armed services, it is unlikely that any change will
ever come from within [Lifemark communication, July
1980] .
NME, Inc., reported that it is not necessary for the
CEO of a hospital to be a physician, that none of its hospi-
tal CEOs are physicians, that the CEO position is administra-
tive and managerial in nature, that .01% of its top executives
are providers, and that, generally speaking, administrators
make the best CEOs. NME went on to say that "I do not agree
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with the use of physicians in positions which are primarily-
administrative in nature, for the primary reason that physi-
cians are not trained in managerial skills necessary to ef-
fectively function in these positions" [NME communication,
July 1980]
.
Of the four proprietary hospital corporations mentioned,
none are controlled by physicians. Of all the individual
institutions that these four corporations own or operate, none
have a physician as a CEO. This is in keeping with the CO/CEO
determination model of this paper. All of the four organiza-
tions' facilities have nonphysician administrators as their
CEOs. These CEOs are, in turn, responsible to other administra-
tors all the way up the corporate ladder. The goals and orien-
tations of the individual facilities are organizational in
nature, in that the very survival of the organization depends
upon the effective and efficient management of each individual
facility. If a specific facility is inefficient and/or un-
profitable for a period of time, it will not survive. The
corporate entity may absorb losses for a short period of time,
but cannot do so for an extended period if it expects to
survive.
It is the duty and responsibility of the facility CEO to
maximize profit, consistent with acceptable health care. He
is accountable to administrators for that duty and responsi-
bility. Therefore, the CEOs of all the facilities represented





The more provider or care oriented a facility is, the
less organizationally oriented it will be. Indeed, Table 1
shows a continuum of organizational orientation that rises
as the system becomes more and more proprietary in nature.
It is suspected that the governmental hospitals will
acquire more of the organizational characteristics as their
budgets come under ever increasing scrutiny from dollar con-
scious Congressmen/women and taxpayers
.
A System in Transition
Organizationally speaking, the VAH system begins to take
on the complexion of a proprietary system below the level of
the director of VA medicine. All regional directors are ad-
ministrators rather than physicians, and the majority of the
CEOs of individual facilities are also not physicians. While
the facility director at VAHSF is a physician, he states that
he is the exception to the rule and that the only reason he
is presently serving in that position is that the CEO experi-
ence will better qualify him for an executive position at VA
headquarters in Washington, D.C. The VAHSF CEO also said
that the reason most VA hospitals have administrators as their
CEO is because VA physicians cannot draw any special remunera-
tion if they are in an administrative position. This recent
VA ruling caused most physicians who were working as administra-
tors to return voluntarily to clinical medicine. The annual
pay difference is in the thousands of dollars and it appears
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as though they were unwilling to forego that pay for the
privilege of being in "executive medicine" [VAHSF interview,
July 1980]
.
The VAH system, according to the CO/CEO model, appears
to be in a transition phase. That is, it is in the process
of making the move from a patient/provider-oriented system
to one that will incorporate some organizational characteris-
tics. This observation is based on the fact that nearly all
CEO positions are now filled by administrators, whereas they





The CEO/CO of a health care facility should be a physician
if a relatively high score is obtained in the care oriented
mode of the CEO/CO determination model, such as the score of
the Navy system in Table 1, Alternately, a lower score in
this mode indicates that an administrator might be the appro-
priate choice. The proprietaries represent the opposite ex-
treme of the Navy's score in the care oriented mode. The more
care oriented a hospital is, the more apt it is to have a
physician as the CEO/CO,
The most effective CEO/CO for a health care facility that
is provider oriented would be a physician. The governmental
hospitals scored high in this category, with the Navy the
highest; and, they are physician oriented. That Stanford
scored high was attributable to its research and training
characteristics; but, its proprietary-like nature dictates
that SUMC have an administrator as CEO.
Administrators are the most effective choice for CEO/CO
in facilities that are organizationally oriented. Institu-
tions, such as the proprietaries, are administrator dominated,
and the facilities are quite efficient. The relatively high
score of KFH, a non-profit facility, is derived from its pro-
prietary nature. The Navy scored lowest here, giving added
credence to its present CEO/CO assignment policy.
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Systems and facilities whose orientations may be in a
transition phase from one mode to another, such as the VA,
should use administrators—even though the system executives
continue to be physicians—if the direction of the move is
towards organizational orientation. However, as long as the
primary orientation of the facility is care oriented, and
the move is towards provider orientation, the physician is
still the most appropriate choice.
In regards to the Navy, this writer is forced to conclude
that physicians should continue to hold the CO/CEO positions,
as well as other executive medicine billets, so long as the
Navy Medical Department continues to be a provider/care oriented
system. This conclusion may change if Congress and the tax-
paying public demand efficiency in Federal health care systems,






1. Describe your area of cognizance.
2. What do you perceive are your most important duties or
responsibilities?
3. What duties or responsibilities take up most of your
time?
4. Is there a person or persons that you are directly respon-
sible to? (Is there someone you have to keep happy?)
5. What do you perceive that a person believes is the most
important thing you need to do?
6. What sort of leverage or control does that person have
over you?
7. How do those controls affect your effectiveness of
operation?
8. How do you ensure that this organization is operating
effectively and still meet your patients', staffs', and
superiors', expectations?
9. Describe your service population. Is there anything about
them that requires special or extraordinary measures in
order for you to achieve full operational effectiveness?
10. Is there a conflict between your superiors' wants and your
service population's wants? If so, you do you resolve
the conflict?
11. Do you believe that the chief executive officer position
is primarily administrative or managerial in nature?
12. Do you believe that a physician makes a more effective
C.E.O. than a non-physician?
13. If so, explain what qualities or qualifications a physician
has that makes him a better C.E.O.
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14. If not, can you explain why most governmental hospitals,
such as PHS and the Armed Forces use M.D.s as C.E.O.s
rather than non-physician administrators?
15. Considering all factors of the duties involved, such as
war, peace, the physician shortage, etc., who do you
think should be the C.E.O. or Commanding Officer of a
military hospital; a physician or a non-physician
administrator?
16. If physician, then do you think a non-physician would be
feasible or could function effectively within the mili-





1. Director of the VA Medical Center and of the fee-for-service
provided by the civilian sector to VA beneficiaries for all of
Northern California.
2. The director has total responsibility for everything that
happens at the hospital. Everything is important. The VA Medi-
cal Center director is the CEO in the most complete sense of
the word.
3. If the basic structure of the hospital is working well, the
director can spend most of his time on matters that may seem
trivial, such as greeting guests, veterans groups, dignitaries,
and so forth, but, in reality, have great underlying importance.
Detecting situations that are potential trouble spots or prob-
lems is also very important. The assistant director handles
administration and the chief of staff handles clinical matters.
4. Yes, the regional director.
5. Concurs with that of the hospital director.
6. Line authority.
7. The priorities are the same, therefore, there is no conflict
8. By holding those in control responsible for their actions.
Otherwise, sound management techniques and effective
communication.
9. Veterans' Administration beneficiaries, as described by
law. Yes, the service population is aging at a rapid pace,
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due -to the World War II peak of veterans beginning to move
into their sixties. This causes their consumption of care to
increase as their ages rise; demand is increasing.
10. Only that the service population's demands exceed what
the budget allows the center to provide.
11. Yes.
12. The VA has not found that either is uniquely better at
the job. The VA is reluctant to lose all physician CEOs be-
cause the top jobs at VA headquarters are limited to physi-
cians, and experience as a hospital director is a very desirable
background for these top jobs.
13. delete
14. The VA uses administrators to a great extent. The VA has
very few physicians left as directors. Otherwise, it is just
a tradition extending from the purpose of a hospital.
15. The professional background of a person is irrelevant;
both should be used. Of 168 hospital directors in the VA,
only 6 or 7 are physicians. This limits the selection for
the top positions at the headquarters, as they must be physi-
cians. But, if a physician wants to be a hospital director,
he must give up his special pay that physicians are eligible
to receive. This was a negotiation factor with the Office of
Management and Budget (0MB) . Special pay for physicians would
only be given to those in positions that require physician's
skills. The hospital director's position does not require an
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M.D.; therefore, any M.D. serving in that capacity does not






1. Administrator of the San Francisco KFH, which is one of
13 in the Northern California region. This includes all KFH
and PMG activities in San Francisco, and represents a work
force of approximately 1500 people. The administrator works
with the physician-in-chief, who has the overall professional
responsibility of the hospital in terms of quality of care,
physician matters, and so forth.
2. Keeping the operation within its budget. Negotiating an
adequate budget with his superiors.
3. Trivia does not bother him unless he chooses to be bothered
by it, because he has sufficient staff support to take care of
everyday problems. However, he does spent about 20% of his
time on incidental matters because he does not want to lose
touch with the everyday operations of the hospital. Planning
and review occupies the majority of his time.
4. Yes, the regional director, who is an administrator. He
also happens to be a physician but, this is an exception be-
cause regional directors are generally administrators.
5. Concurs with the priorities of the administrator.
6. Line authority, the regional director has the authority
to hire or fire the hospital administrator.




8. Sound management techniques and businesslike practices.
9. Twenty-one percent of the population of San Francisco.
Eleven percent are age 65 or over. The language requirement






12. No, but the cooperation of the physicians is important,
13. (delete)
14. No, other than tradition.
15. If qualified administrators are available, there is no
reason why they should not be able to occupy those positions
provided that there are physicians available to take care of
physicians* problems, and provided that there would be a high







1. A five state responsibility including California, Nevada,
Utah, Arizona, and Hawaii.
2. Develop hospital services and deliver health care to our
(PHS) beneficiary population.
3. Administrative duties take up most of his time, clinical
duties come next.
4. Yes, the beneficiaries in a positive sense. In the con-
text of "keeping someone off his back," the director of hospi-
tals and clinics in the line authority above him.
5. Concurs with that of the hospital director.
6. Line authority.
7. The "bureaucracy" is the big problem, not his superior.
Everything gets tied up in the operation of the system, it's
not flexible enough.
8. The effectiveness of the hospital and the expectations of
those involved are not mutually exclusive. These two factors
go together. Internal review and efficiency are the foremost
factors.
9. Seamen have special needs such as quick turn around times
between in-port and at-sea operations. This limits case follow-
up. The unique social and cultural aspects of the American
Indian population require special appreciation. The refugees
are a special group with stressful problems.
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10. No, they are very responsive and supportive. Within the
context of national priorities, the beneficiary problem has
been instrumental in keeping PHSHSF open. There is no doubt that
that the loud, free expression by the beneficiaries has fore-
gone the closure of the hospital.
11. Yes.
12. (I) do, but (my) standpoint is not unbiased.
13. Although the attributes a person brings to a job are more
important than the professional degree the person has, the or-
ganization the PHS currently has is more conducive to admini-
stration by a physician. Control over the medical staff is
best handled by a M.D. because responsiveness to and control
over the medical staff must be based on mutual understanding
of needs and professional respect. The medical staff feels
that a physician CEO more readily identifies with the problems
concerning recruitment and retention. They feel that their
value systems will be attended to more effectively by a physi-
cian. Physicians, in a system such as the PHS, are better
able to compete for medical needs than nonphysicians
.
14. (delete)
15. The use of physicians as CEOs is not a waste. The
same reasons as were provided in question number 13 apply
here, also.
16. The issue here is the individual rather than the pro-
fession. An individual from either profession could bring
certain attributes to a CEO job that would make him/her an
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